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INTRODUCTION
Directors of “for profit” and “nonprofit” health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), like all corporate directors, are subject to the duty of care in their oversight
of the business. This duty extends over business performance as well as compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. Within the scope of this duty is the
responsibility for attentive oversight of the corporation’s information systems.
Directors may be held personally liable for business losses stemming from the
failure to meet their duty of care. Most states apply the gross negligence standard
when evaluating directors’ conduct. This standard reflects the statutory and judicial
views that corporate goals, and those of the nation’s economy, are best served by a
degree of risk-taking that may be greater than that of the prudent person. Only
where directors’ actions are based in self-dealing, fraud or are found to be wholly
lacking in good faith will courts find conduct which constitutes gross negligence.
The art and science of managed care for the majority of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) is wholly dependent on the plan’s automated information
systems. HMOs are distinctive for the volume, variability and volatility of the data
on which they rely to conduct business. This degree of reliance makes effective
information systems a fundamental prerequisite for the HMO’s success. Indeed,
“[c]ompetition, employer concerns over costs, and government awareness of health
care budgets are merely bit players in a drama that has information systems
technology as the central character.”2
The HMO’s information management task is prodigious. The major areas of
information requirements: membership, provider contracts, utilization review and
2

Louis Rossiter, The Research Agenda in Managed Care, in MAKING MANAGED
HEALTHCARE WORK 584 (Peter Boland ed., 1993).
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claims payment – each in themselves complex – require a seamless integration in
order to manage care effectively, run a business profitably, and comply with myriad
external reporting requirements. It is common for HMOs to utilize multiple
information systems, running the different business applications, e.g., enrollment and
billing, claims and authorizations, and utilization review and case management, on
separate operating software and hardware.3 In this paper, the terms “information
system” and “systems” are used to refer generally to all of the computer based or
automated business functions of an organization.
HMOs and other health insurers are subject to substantial state and federal
regulatory requirements. Publicly traded companies must also comply with the rules
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the securities exchange markets
on which the stock is traded. Violations of these requirements carry the risk of
substantial fines, exclusion from government entitlement programs, criminal
sanctions and delisting from the trading exchanges. Compliance with these
requirements is heavily dependent on the quality and integrity of the HMO’s
information systems.
Information systems have evolved from an expense item to a strategic investment
in the future of the company.4 Although the health care industry lags others in the
extent of information systems investment, spending by managed care companies on
information systems is about 2% of revenues and growing.5 Considering the scale of
the larger HMOs such as Kaiser Permanente and the combined Blue Cross Blue
Shield HMOs, the information system investment can be enormous. Kaiser, for
example, plans on spending $1.5 billion to upgrade its information systems over the
next four years.6
Given this scale of investment, the centrality of information systems to the
success of an HMO, the obligation of regulatory compliance, plus the attention now
focused on the year 2000 “millenium bug” problem,7 information systems are clearly
a major area of concern and oversight by corporate directors. This paper analyzes
the role of information systems in HMOs and the nature of the HMO directors’ duty
of care in monitoring the integrity of the information systems to determine when
directors may be held personally liable for losses suffered by the corporation when
the systems collapse.

3
Peter R. Kongstvedt, Using Data in Medical Management, in THE MANAGED HEALTH
CARE HANDBOOK 440 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 3d ed. 1996).
4
Robert Reese, Information Systems Operations and Organizational Structures, in THE
MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 455, 455 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 3d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter Reese, Information Systems].
5

Id.

6

Milt Freudenheim, Kaiser HMO, Erring on Costs, Posts $270 Million Loss for ’97, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998 at D1 [hereinafter Freudenheim, Kaiser HMO, Erring on Costs].
7
The millenium bug problem stems from the wide spread practice in legacy systems of
coding information systems to recognize a two digit date. When the year 2000 arrives the
digits “00” will be interpreted as 1900. This was expected to result potentially disastrous
systems failures, but the 2000 transition passed with relatively few computer problems in the
U.S.
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Section I addresses in general the nature of the corporate director’s duty of care
to monitor business performance. Section II considers the requirements of finding a
director liable for negligence in failing to meet this duty. Section III gives an
overview of the HMO industry’s dependence on information systems. Section IV
focuses specifically on the recent experience of the Oxford Health Plan. Section V
discusses the potential liability of an HMO’s board in light of the events at Oxford
and applicable legal standards for the director’s duty of care in monitoring. Section
VI concludes with observations on the limits to directors’ liability.
I. THE NATURE OF DIRECTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
The structure of corporations is governed largely by state law. “Corporations are
creatures of state law and it is state law which is the font of corporate directors’
powers.”8 Although some states base their corporate laws on the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) and others, such as Delaware and Maryland,
have their own distinctive corporate codes, all states require that corporations be
managed under the direction of a board of directors.9
In broad terms, the board of directors is responsible for the conduct of the
business.
In a large corporation, typically the day to day management
responsibilities are delegated to the executive and other senior staff. This delegation
does not release the directors from responsibility to oversee the actions of
management.10
All corporate boards are accountable to certain groups. In a publicly owned
corporation, the directors answer to the shareholders.11 In a mutual benefit
corporation accountability runs to the members.12 In public benefit or religious
corporations the state of incorporation, typically in the person of the attorney
general, speaks for the beneficiaries under the doctrine of parens patriae, and may
call the corporation’s directors to account.13
Accountability may take different forms. A director may be voted out of office
by shareholders or members if they do not approve of the director’s performance.14

8

Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).

9

DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1996); MD CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 2-401 (1993 & Supp. 1998).
10
E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised
Model Act, the Trans-Union Case, and the ALI Project – A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1483, 1501 (1985) [hereinafter Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule].
11

Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.03(d) (revised 1997).

12

See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975); Amabile v.
Lerner, 166 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960), aff’d 181 A.2d 520 (1962).
13

COMMITTEE ON NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDEBOOK
DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 13-14 (George W. Overton ed., 1993)
[hereinafter GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS]; Deborah DeMott,
Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 145 (1993).
FOR

14
Model Bus. Corp. Act, § 8.08(a) (revised 1997). See also, LEWIS SOLOMON ET. AL,
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 531 (1994). Voting a director out of office can be an uphill
battle for shareholders. Id. Incumbent directors and management, with access to the corporate
proxy statement and corporate treasury, have the distinct advantage in any proxy fight. Id. As
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Although a director cannot act on behalf of the corporation as an individual (unless
the director is also an officer of the corporation) a director may be personally liable
for failing to carry out her fiduciary duties. The usual vehicle for finding personal
liability is a derivative suit, brought by shareholders15 or members16 on behalf of the
corporation against the directors and officers. Such cases typically sound in
negligence, alleging that the directors’ conduct fell short of the duties of loyalty or
care and as a result the corporation was harmed. These cases can result in substantial
damages awards against directors.17 Corporations typically indemnify their directors
by terms of the corporate bylaws or charters and acquire Directors and Officers
liability insurance for this purpose.18
The specific roles and responsibilities of directors are not enumerated in great
detail in corporation codes, rather the size and nature of the business will influence
what exactly the board will do. The role of the director is largely one of monitoring,
for example reviewing financial statements and other reports, overseeing compliance
with local, state and federal laws, punctuated by relatively few decisions. One
commentator characterizes the balance as ninety percent monitoring and ten percent
decision-making.19 According to Newton Minow, former member of the Federal
Commerce Commission and director of Sara Lee, Manpower and Aon, two of the
most important decisions directors make are selecting a new chief executive officer
and “figuring out what to do when the place is in trouble.”20 This observation
appears to overlook the importance of the board’s decision about how to evaluate the
CEO. The choice of evaluation criteria, for example, long term versus short term
results, may affect whether the corporation gets into trouble in the first place. The
board will be involved in both the beginning and ending of any major corporate
initiative, such as an acquisition or divestiture21 as well as any “material transactions
affecting the assets of the enterprise.”22
While the specific activities of directors may vary greatly based on the business,
all boards share certain responsibilities. Directors are fiduciaries. The qualities of
fiduciary duty have brought forth stirring descriptions in legal opinions in keeping
a practical matter, “most public corporations are firmly controlled by self-perpetuating boards
of directors or by the senior corporate officers that those boards ostensibly have elected.” Id.
15

Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.40 (1997).

16

O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 404 (1994).

17

See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (which ultimately resulted in
multimillion dollar settlement awards against individual directors).
18
William Knepper, An Overview of D&O Liability for Insurance Company Directors and
Officers, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 63, 67-68 (1978) [hereinafter Knepper, An Overview of D&O
Liability]; Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.50 (1997).
19

Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1492-95 (1984) [hereinafter Manning, Time for Reality].
20

John A. Byrne et al., The Best and Worst Boards, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 92.

21

GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 7.

22

COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (Rev. ed., 1978) reprinted in 33 BUS. LAWYER 1591-1644, 1607
(1978) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK].
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with the weight of obligation the fiduciary shoulders. “Many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals
of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”23
Implicit in the obligations of the fiduciary are the twin duties of loyalty and
care.24 These standards, derived from over a century of litigation, apply equally to
business and nonprofit corporations.25 The duty of loyalty requires the director to
put the interests of the corporation first and her own interests last. The duty of care,
the focus of this article, speaks to how a director carries out her job. Defining the
duty of care with precision has proven a challenge to commentators, judges and
regulators. The RMBCA adopts general standards for a director’s performance: to
act in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise, and in a manner reasonably expected to be in the best interests of the
corporation.26 The official comment to the RMBCA notes that the elements and
circumstances of the director’s duty of care, referenced as an element of the business
judgment rule, “are continuing to be developed by the courts.”27
A. Duty of Care
In spite of the general terms of the RMBCA and the equally general, though
differently phrased, terms of various state regulations,28 some clarity can be found in
decisions and commentary about the duty of care. “[T]he heart of the director’s true
responsibility is attention to his ongoing multiple functions.”29 For example,
directors are expected to have a basic knowledge of the business; to read the
materials provided them; and to inquire for adequate information prior to rendering a
decision. Directors are entitled to trust the information given them by responsible
persons in the corporation but only so long as the director has reason to trust, and no
reason not to trust, the information.
“As a general rule, a director should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding
of the business of the corporation. Accordingly, a director should become familiar
with the fundamentals of the business in which the corporation is engaged.”30
Professor Manning contends that the board has an inherent responsibility to ensure
the structural integrity of the corporation. This means the board is responsible for
23

Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).

24

CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 1599-1600.

25

GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 21.

26

Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 (1997).

27

Official Comment, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 (revised 1997).

28

A number of states have adopted the RMBCA standard of the ordinarily prudent person
in a like position under similar circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1997);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-405.1 (1993 & Supp.1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
156B, § 65 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 6-14 (West 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512
(West 1998).
29

Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1492-95 (1984).

30

Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981).
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seeing that there is a functioning management structure and an internal information
system, generally suitable to the company’s character to keep management informed
and to provide accurate accounting data upon which to base financial statements.31
Meeting this responsibility requires a sufficient understanding of the nature of the
business to know whether the management or information structures in place are
adequate to their respective tasks.
The process by which a director informs herself will vary under the specific
circumstances of the matter at hand, but every director must take steps to inform
herself of the relevant background and circumstances before taking action.32 First
among the logical steps is to read the materials provided to the board. “Needless to
say, the director should read the information with which he or she is supplied.”33
Given the board’s responsibility for the financial health of the corporation, directors
should be familiar with the financial status of the corporation.34 The commentary to
the Model Act reinforces this obligation, by limiting the director’s reliance to
information of which they have first hand knowledge. If the director has not read, or
heard in oral presentation, or otherwise taken steps to become familiar with certain
information, she cannot later protect herself by claiming reliance.35
B. Reliance
A director may place reasonable reliance on information, reports and statements
prepared by officers or employees of the corporation, professional advisors and
consultants, and committees of the board, provided she has a reasonable basis for
doing so.36 Similarly, where duties have been delegated to management, directors
may rely on “the presumption of regularity, absent knowledge or notice to the
contrary.”37 A director must reasonably believe that the persons presenting
information merit her confidence.38 A director who accepts or relies on information
when she has knowledge which would make reliance unreasonable may be liable for
any action taken on the basis of the unreliable information; this situation could arise,
for example, if the director had knowledge that a report was based on faulty or
incomplete information.
C. Duty of Inquiry
The reliance protection has limits, however, and there comes a point at which a
director is obligated to inquire further. Precisely where that point lies is the subject

31

Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1499 (emphasis added).

32

Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 10, at 1495.

33

GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 23;
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 1602.
34

Francis, supa note 30, at 821-22.

35

Official Comment, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (1997).

36

Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (revised 1997); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991
& Supp. 1996).
37

Official Comment, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.30(a)(1997).

38

Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (revised 1997).
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of some disagreement among commentators. At one end of the spectrum, Professor
Stuart Cohn suggests that the director’s duty to inquire should take effect on the
basis of alertness to potentially significant concerns.39 This view recognizes that
directors should be attentive to warnings of future problems. Manning would expect
the director to inquire perhaps a little later, when she becomes aware of “credible
signs of serious trouble.”40 The generally stated requirement found in the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance says that the duty of inquiry arises “when, but
only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director … to the need [for
further inquiry].”41 The Commentary to the Model Act states that a problem must be
obvious to the director before requiring inquiry,42 suggesting that the duty to inquire
arises at a point later in time than warnings of potential problems.
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey has advocated
the “red flag doctrine.” Although directors are not expected to “ferret out” problems
which they have no reason to suspect exist, Veasey states that when warning signs of
trouble are obvious, the duty of further inquiry does arise.43 This view recognizes
the importance of attention to early warning signals, before a problem erupts. The
warnings themselves must be obvious, so as to protect the board from having to
respond to every possible signal of trouble ahead. Where, however, directors have
actual evidence of serious problems within the company, commentators agree that
directors must inquire further.
D. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule operates as a shield to protect directors from personal
liability, under certain circumstances, for business decisions that have proved bad for
the corporation. Provided the directors acted in good faith, without self-dealing or
personal interest, and exercised reasonable diligence in making the decision, the
business judgment rule will protect the directors from liability.44 The policy
underlying this rule recognizes that directors must make complex decisions,
balancing risk and benefit to the corporation, often under pressures of time and
imperfect information. Provided that the process used by the board to reach the
decision is sound, and specifically that it conforms to the duty of care standard, it is
unreasonable for courts to second guess the board. It is also highly unlikely that a
judge, ruling years after the fact, will be able to reach any better result.45

39
Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 602 (1983)
[hereinafter Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care].
40

Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1484.

41

Principles of Corporate Governance, § 4.01(a)(1), American Law Institute (Final draft,
1992).
42

Official comment, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (revised 1997).

43

Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 10, at 1502 (referring to
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)).
44

Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959, 96364 (1986).
45

Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
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The business judgment rule  which focuses on decisions  and the director’s
duty of care  which focuses on the deliberative process  do come together. If
directors fail to take adequate care in rendering a decision  to review information
provided, to inquire for further information when appropriate, to understand the
fundamentals of the business  then they will find no protection in the business
judgment rule. If, however, the directors do reach their decision deliberatively, using
the information available to them, with good faith in the quality and reliability of the
information, then even a decision which proves disastrous for the corporation will
not subject the directors to personal liability.46
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINDING OF PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
MONITOR
A director may be held personally liable for losses incurred by the corporation
which proximately result from the director’s failure to monitor corporate operations.
The director’s obligation to monitor the activities of the corporation extends over
business performance as well as compliance with relevant laws.47 “Liability to the
corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board
to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the
loss.”48 A negligence claim against a director for breach of duty of care requires
proof of the elements of duty, breach, causation and harm.49
Having discussed above the general nature of the directors’ duty of care, the
analysis next turns to these requirements, specifically: the appropriate standard
governing directors’ duty of care, whether information systems are within the scope
of the directors’ duty, the nature of the harm to the corporation which may subject
the director to personal liability, and the difficult task of proving that directors’
nonfeasance caused the harm.
A. Gross Negligence Standard
Although state statutory standards vary, “corporate directors are held to a gross
negligence standard of care, either by statute or under the common law and judicial
application of the business judgment rule.”50 Twelve states, including Florida,
Kansas and Ohio, have established the gross negligence standard by statute.51 In
these states, the statutory enactment appears to have been a direct response to the

46

Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care, supra note 39, at 602.

47

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
[hereinafter In re Caremark].
48

Id. (emphasis in original).

49

J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MOD. TORT LAW § 3.02 (Rev. ed. 1994, 1998 Supp.)

50

Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and
Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It’s Gross Negligence Regardless of
Whether Section 1821(K) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169,
193 (1994) [hereinafter Stevens & Neilson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers]
(article analyses of state statutory and common law regarding corporate directors generally in
addition to directors of financial institutions).
51

Id. at 194-208.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

54

[Vol. 14:45

savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. In the aftermath of this national financial
debacle, states passed legislation to protect the directors of financial institutions from
liability for simple negligence in myriad lawsuits by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and its precursor, the Resolution Trust Corporation.52 In eighteen states,
including Delaware, and the District of Columbia, courts have applied the gross
negligence standard, often based on the business judgment rule53. This common law
rule prevails even where statutes suggest the simple negligence standard of the
“ordinarily prudent person in like circumstances”, e.g, Maryland and New York.54
Only four states fully apply the simple negligence standard for corporate directors:
Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Tennessee.55 In the remaining sixteen
states, including California, Illinois and Pennsylvania, “neither the legislature nor the
courts have clearly established the standard of care for directors and officers of
financial institutions or corporations.”56
The business judgment rule and the gross negligence standard combine to
establish the demanding evidentiary requirement that directors must be shown to
have acted either in fraud, bad faith, self-dealing, conflict of interest57 or to have
acted recklessly or with malicious purpose or with deliberate, wanton and reckless
disregard for the corporation’s interests.58 The Delaware Chancery Court described
this standard in the corporate context as meaning “reckless indifference to or a
deliberate disregard of the whole body of shareholders” characterized by actions
which are “without the bounds of reason.”59
Underlying the applied gross negligence standard is the judicial view that
corporations and the economy are not well served by directors who exercise only
ordinary judgment and prudence. “The corporate form gets its utility in large part
from its ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk.”60 If
directors are personally liable based on the standard of a person of average judgment
and risk assessment, directors will tend to make less risky investment decisions,
which will limit the corporation’s economic potential.61
It has been argued that the gross negligence standard might be moderated given
the nature of the HMO business. One commentator suggested in 1981 that directors
of HMOs should be held to a higher standard, that is, liable for simple negligence, on
52

Id. at 194. See generally, Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S 213 (1997).

53

Stevens & Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers, supra note 50, at
208-18.
54

MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-405.1(a) (1993 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. BUS. CORP.
§ 717(a)(McKinney 1998).
55
Stevens & Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers, supra note 50, at
218-21.
56

Id. at 221.

57

Id. at 190.

58

Id. at 199-201.

59

Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861, slip op. at 31 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990).

60

In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.

61

Id.

1999-2000]

DIRECTORS’ DUTY OF CARE

55

the reasoning that “[d]irectors of certain significant industries … which are of
particular public concern, are in fact judged by a higher standard of care. It is easy to
make the argument that the HMO industry, like the insurance and banking industries,
is so complex, important, and vital to the public interest that extraordinary standards
of care should be imposed on such directors.”62 However easy the argument might
have been in 1981, and despite public demand for a higher standard of liability for
directors, the trend in corporate law has clearly headed in the opposite direction, with
a greater focus on limiting the liability of corporate directors generally.63
B. Information Systems are Within the Scope of the Directors’ Duty of Care
In addition to the general nature of the director’s duty of care is the question of
whether a particular area of business concern is properly within the scope of that
duty. Commentators, courts and regulators have all pinpointed information systems
as falling within the responsibility of the board of directors.
A recent decision by the Court of Chancery of Delaware, In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Action64, emphasizes the importance of board oversight
of information systems. Noting that timely and relevant information is “an essential
predicate” for meeting a board’s supervisory and monitoring role under Delaware
law, the court characterizes the board’s obligation as one of
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the
organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior
management and … the board itself timely, accurate information
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to
reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance
with law and its business performance.65
The board is held to the standard of good faith in determining that the
information system is conceptually and functionally adequate to the task of assuring
the board that appropriate information is available in a timely manner.66 The
Chancellor goes on to say:
I am of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.67
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Regulators also view oversight of information systems as a board responsibility.
Anticipation of the year 2000 problem, a/k/a “the millenium bug,”68 has prompted
the Securities Exchange Commission to recommend requiring board approval of the
year 2000 project plan for public companies.69
Clearly directors cannot be expected to know the fine details of a system’s design
or implementation.70 Yet the board must seek credible assurances that adequate
systems are in place.71 In seeking such assurances, directors are protected from
liability when they reasonably rely on information from internal and external sources
provided the directors have reason to believe such sources merit their confidence.72
C. Proof of Harm
In the case of a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the corporation, the
harm alleged is typically a decline in stock value owing to mismanagement or waste
of corporate assets.73 A shareholder may also sue for damages individually, where
she can show injury peculiar to a particular class of shareholders or to shareholder
interests, as opposed to those of the corporation itself.74 With a nonprofit
corporation, the alleged harm may be found in the depletion of corporate assets as
caused, for example, by self-dealing by the directors75, or outright fraud.76
Alternatively, the harm may be found in the corporation’s failing to carry out its
charge or the directors approving an act viewed as ultra vires.77
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See, e.g., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates, Board
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1998). This problem has also given rise to a new specialty in systems consulting, see, e.g.,
Y2K Damage Consultants (visited Nov. 29, 1998) <http://www.y2k-damage-expert.com>.
Promotional copy for this consultant places high priority on the issue of directors’ liability. Id.
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connection with purchases of computer hardware and software, as well as their current actions
in assessing and addressing potential Year 2000 problems.” Id.
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D. Proof of Causation
Clearing the hurdles of establishing the presence and appropriate level of duty of
care, the plaintiff must still prove causation. Where the claim lies in the
nonfeasance of directors, the causation requirement is made more difficult. The
plaintiff must first establish what would have been reasonable actions on the part of
the board under the circumstances.78 The plaintiff must then prove that the proper
performance of the directors’ duties would have avoided the loss, and further, what
loss specifically would have be averted by such action.79 Such a proximate cause
proof can be fraught with speculation. “[W]hen a business fails from general
mismanagement, business incapacity, or bad judgment, how is it possible to say that
a single director could have made the company successful, or how much in dollars he
could have saved?”80
Bad results alone cannot be the basis on which to infer a breach of duty. In
Caremark, the Delaware Chancellor noted that “[n]either the fact that the Board,
although advised by lawyers and accountants, did not accurately predict the severe
consequences to the company that would ultimately follow from the … strategies
and practices that ultimately led to this liability, nor the scale of the liability, gives
rise to an inference of breach of any duty imposed by corporation law upon the
directors of Caremark.”81
A key factor in the causation analysis is the timing of directors’ actions.
Directors may not become aware of a problem until it is too late to take any effective
remedial action. In Briggs v. Spaulding,82 a bank insolvency case, two directors who
had recently joined the board were alleged to have breached their duty of care. The
Supreme Court found the defendant directors were woefully inattentive to the affairs
of the bank, particularly as to oversight of the cashier’s practices. Yet, the Court
recognized that even if these directors had made prompt and careful inquiries, such
action could not have come in time to have saved the bank. The business was
already ruined; nothing that the new directors might have done at that point could
have changed the end result.83
III. OVERVIEW OF THE HMO INDUSTRY
A detailed history of the HMO industry is beyond the scope of this paper. The
following provides a general orientation to the industry and its operational
challenges.
A. A Brief History of HMOs
HMOs exist on a broad continuum of managed care entities. Managed care is “a
system which integrates the financing and delivery of appropriate medical care”
employing features such as contracts with selected physicians and hospitals,
78
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80

Id. at 616-17.

81

In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.

82

141 U.S. 132, 164 (1891).

83

Id.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

58

[Vol. 14:45

utilization and quality controls, financial incentives for patients to stay within the
contracted provider network; assumption of varying degrees of financial risk by
providers.84 HMOs are the most restrictive of managed care entities, typically
requiring enrollees to seek care only through primary care gatekeepers and then only
by referral to specialists and facilities within the HMOs contracted network.
The HMOs of today descend from a variety of arrangements under which
physicians contracted on a pre-paid basis to provide medical services for a group of
individuals or a business’s employees.85 During the 1930s and 1940s group practices
formed to serve Kaiser employees at the company’s shipbuilding and construction
sites; these were the precursors to the Kaiser Foundation Health Plans.86 The Group
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound and the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New
York were also established during this period, under similar principles of pre-paid
group practice.87
The pre-paid group practice model was not widely adopted in this country until
the late 1980s. In the intervening forty years two things restrained the growth of
HMOs: vigorous opposition by the American Medical Association and the relatively
low rate of growth in health care costs. When health care costs began to increase
sharply in the 1970s, the federal government championed the concept of pre-paid
group practice with the enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973.88 Even with government subsidies of over $200 million during the 1970s to
encourage the formation of HMOs by nonprofit groups, HMO enrollment was slow.
By 1976, HMO membership had reached only six million – falling far short of the
government’s goal of 40 million by that date.89 It was not until the 1980s when the
cost of health care soared that employers turned to HMOs with enthusiasm in an
effort to reduce their health benefits expenditure.90 During the 1980s HMO
enrollment more than tripled from 10.2 million to 39 million; in 1997 HMO
enrollment stood at 78 million, including 30% of the population insured through the
workplace.91
In the last two years the federal government and most states have turned to the
HMO model and other forms of managed care to arrest continued cost escalation in
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Medicare and Medicaid.92 Although many HMOs courted this new membership
aggressively, this new deal has not been altogether successful. Recent news reports
document the steady exodus of managed care plans from these markets as companies
have found the population more costly to care for than anticipated while
reimbursement rates are ratcheted down.93
B. Different Models of HMOs
HMOs operate under different models. In the early days of this delivery system
the models were fairly distinct. The most common has been the independent practice
association (IPA) model, in which the HMO entity contracts with independent
provider associations or group practices to provide care for enrollees; forty-two
percent of HMO members are in IPA model plans.94 The staff model, in which the
HMO employs physicians and other providers, is relatively rare and accounts for
only about 1% of total HMO enrollment.95 The true group model, in which a single
physician group contracts exclusively with the health plan, as is the case with the
various Permanente Medical Groups and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plans,
accounts for just 11% of total HMO enrollment.96 Under contractual arrangements,
providers may be reimbursed on a capitation basis, i.e., paid a set fee for each patient
for each period, on a fee for service basis according to a fee schedule, or on a global
basis for a defined set of services.
As the industry has matured, and as employers have demanded greater flexibility
in pricing and product design, the distinctions among models of care delivery have
blurred. “Staff and group model HMOs, faced with limited capital and a need to
expand into new territories, are forming IPA components. Meanwhile, some IPAs
have created staff model primary care centers while continuing to contract with
physicians in independent practices for specialty services. HMOs are offering PPO
[preferred provider organizations] and POS [point of service] products, and some
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PPOs are obtaining HMO licenses . . . In short, the managed care environment is
becoming more complicated.”97
Mixed model plans, those which combine more than one type of delivery model,
are the fastest growing type of HMO today, increasing membership by 24.2% in
1997.98 These models reflect the employers’ interest in controlling costs through
negotiation of different levels of coverage, co-payments and other features for
employees. By offering a range of benefits and product design to employers, HMOs
not only help the employer satisfy their employees’ desire for choices, but also help
the employer hold down the administrative costs by reducing the number of health
plan providers with which the employer must work.
C. Growth of for Profit HMOs
Another change in the environment is the dominance of “for profit” plans.
Although the earliest plans were nonprofit, and the HMO Act of 1973 actively
encouraged the development of such plans, most HMO members today are enrolled
in for profit plans. For profit plan enrollment has grown from forty-two percent in
1987 to the current rate of sixty-two percent.99 An estimated sixty-eight percent100 of
the nation’s 760 HMOs are for profit,101 serving sixty-two percent of total HMO
enrollment.102
D. Competitive Environment
HMOs operate in a highly competitive environment characterized by rising costs,
consolidation, and price sensitivity. In 1997, the overall increase in costs was
6.4%,103 with a major contribution from the rise in pharmacy costs, the fastest
growing line item in health plan budgets.104 Health plans have raised premium
prices, but analysts suggest that rate increases alone will not be enough to maintain
profitability as payers will balk and look elsewhere for coverage.105 Plans have had
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to seek other strategies to maintain membership while keeping earnings in the black.
Consolidation is one of these strategies.
Aetna’s move to acquire Prudential Healthcare for $1 billion is only the latest in
a number of health care mergers and acquisitions.106 In 1998, for example,
Protective Life Corp. purchased United Dental Care, resulting in the nation’s thirdlargest dental managed care company and WellPoint Health Networks, Inc. reached
outside the west coast region to buy Cerulean Cos. Inc., the largest health insurer in
Georgia.107 Among Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) plans, mergers and acquisitions
have reduced the number of plans from 128 to 56 since 1975.108 One of the most
recent of these mergers will combine the BCBS plans in Delaware, Maryland and the
District of Columbia.109
Consolidation gives the HMO increased market power and leverage over
providers. With health care costs on the rise, and payers resistant to bearing the
whole burden, larger plans can exert concentrated pressure on providers to lower fees
and costs.110 The potential for monopolistic market power is one reason why the
A.M.A. urged the Department of Justice to prevent Aetna’s acquiring Prudential.111
Consolidation can give plans greater economies of scale. With more than 700
HMOs operating in the country, payers still have choices among HMOs in most
areas of the country. By consolidating, plans can offer ever larger networks to
payers in both local and regional markets, combined with the administrative
convenience of dealing with a single health plan.
E. Regulatory Environment
HMOs are subject to extensive regulation at the state and federal levels. State
insurance and health departments typically share responsibility for HMOs. Insurance
department oversight usually includes approval of premium rates and contract terms,
requirements for adequate cash reserves to cover projected claims and holding
members harmless for the cost of care covered by premiums;112 many states also
impose interest penalties for late claims payment. State health departments oversee
the provision of health care services, looking to ensure that access to care meets
prescribed standards of waiting time and physicians’ offices meet safety and
equipment maintenance standards.113 Penalties for violations of state regulation can
include fines and restrictions on new enrollment until required corrections are made.
106
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At the federal level, HMOs are subject to stringent regulation. The HMO Act
dictates how HMOs are organized and operated to maintain federal qualification.114
HMOs must comply with these rules in order to contract with the federal government
for coverage of Medicare beneficiaries. The Medicare and Medicaid programs
impose criminal fines and imprisonment penalties for fraud and abuse.115 U.S.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines116 provide a uniform sentencing structure for
organizations which violate federal criminal statutes and “provide for penalties that
equal or often massively exceed those previously imposed on corporations.”117 The
Guidelines provide an incentive for all organizations to have compliance programs in
place. The knowing or willfully ignorant involvement of high-level personnel
(which includes directors) in an offense covered by the Sentencing Guidelines
creates a rebuttable presumption that the organization lacked an effective program to
prevent and detect violations of the law.118
The civil penalties for Medicare fraud and abuse include fines and exclusion
from federal programs. “For providers dependent on Medicare and Medicaid for a
large share of their business, exclusion from these programs can be effectively a
death warrant.”119
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)120 is also
pertinent to HMOs, and specifically to directors. “Over 70% of privately-insured
Americans are insured through employment-related group benefits plans that are
subject to ERISA regulation”.121 With 30% of the privately-insured population
enrolled in HMOs, it is to be expected that most HMOs have some members in
ERISA plans.
Among its myriad provisions governing the funding and
administration of employee benefit plans, ERISA defines the duty of care of plan
fiduciaries, which may include directors, officers, employees and well as
organizations122, as that of a prudent person under like circumstances.123 By statute,
fiduciaries are personally liable for any losses suffered by the employee benefits plan
which result from a breach of duty, and may additionally be subject to other
114
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equitable and remedial relief as deemed appropriate by the courts.124 In contrast to
courts’ application of the gross negligence standard under state statutes, courts
applying ERISA have found fiduciaries liable using the simple negligence
standard.125
F. Operational and Data Processing Requirements for HMOs126
To a great extent, managing care is an exercise in managing information. This is
especially true in the plans that deliver health care services through contractual
arrangements with hospitals, physicians and other providers. As noted above,
distinctions in the delivery system are increasing and reimbursement arrangements
with providers vary. This section summarizes at a high level the general
requirements of an IPA model HMO.
Beyond the informational requirements of any business, such as payroll, general
ledger, business accounts receivable and payable, HMOs’ special data processing
needs fall into three general categories: membership and accounts, provider
contracts, and claims and benefits.127
1. Membership
Membership demographics must be maintained for every enrolled member. This
information includes name and address, date of birth, sex, additional coverage for
coordination of benefits, and the selection of a primary care provider. Member
information will be tied to the account under which members enroll, typically the
employer group, but also government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.
Within a single employer group there may be subgroups such as management and
hourly workers, union and non-union members, each of which may have different
benefits. There may be different eligibility dates for members, for example, three
months after hire.
2. Accounts
HMOs depend on the employer group to provide prompt updates of changes to
membership. Particularly with large groups, such as those with multiple offices,
keeping this information current is difficult. It is not uncommon for membership
updates to be delayed. This results in retroactive disenrollment. The employer will
deduct any premium payment for the employee on subsequent bills, as well as
retroactive to the time the member lost eligibility. Practically speaking this means a
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member can continue to receive care in the plan for weeks or months after he has left
his job or dropped his insurance with no premium payment to offset the expense.
Certain accounts are prone to high turnover in their employees. Government
accounts, among the largest customers of any insurance plan, experience steady ebb
and flow of employees. Businesses which tend to hire large numbers of young
people who stay for one or two years, such as consulting firms and large banks, also
fit this pattern. Particularly prone to volatility are Medicaid plans because recipient
eligibility can shift from month to month depending on changes in assets, income
and family status. High volatility makes current and accurate membership reporting
a challenge.
Employers may purchase unique benefits, adding to or reducing a standard
package. Religious organizations often exclude abortion and sterilization services,
government funded programs may limit these services to particular circumstances.
One large national employer with ties to a particular church at one time extended
dependent coverage beyond the usual age cut-off to those who were serving as
missionaries.
The majority of employer groups renew in January, with most of the rest doing so
in July. Although the decision-making process for members begins months in
advance at the work site, this timing nonetheless results in a crush of work to set up
accounts and complete enrollment at the HMO. Annual account contracts are the
norm. This means that if there is an error in pricing the benefits, the HMO cannot
change the premium for another year.
Many accounts will include performance measures in the HMO contract.
Standards of timeliness and accuracy of claims payments and responsiveness in
customer service are typical of such arrangements. Contractually agreed upon
penalties may include premium reduction and interest payments.
3. Providers
HMOs collect and update detailed information on every provider with whom they
contract. In the case of physicians and other individual practitioners, this
information will include office addresses, specialty qualifications, fee schedule or
capitation rates, limitations on services covered by the contract and tax identification
numbers. A single provider practicing at the same location may have different
contracts with the same HMO depending upon the provider’s specialty. For
example, a physician such as a pediatric cardiologist may have both a primary care
contract at a capitated rate and a separate specialty contract for cardiology services
reimbursed according to a fee schedule. In addition, providers who practice in two
or more locations may have separate contracts and reimbursement rates based, for
example, on the size of the enrolled membership in each region.
Primary care physicians are typically responsible for a defined group of patients,
the “panel”. For these providers an additional file of those members must be
maintained for accurate calculation of monthly capitation as well as to determine
whether the panel is open for new enrollment. The problem of retroactive
disenrollment mentioned above is problematic for capitated providers. In this
circumstance not only is the member dropped from the provider’s panel but the
retroactive capitation for that member will be deducted from the provider’s
reimbursement as well.
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4. Claims and Benefits Administration
The major area in which membership and provider data must interact accurately
is in claims and benefits administration. Typically when a patient leaves the
capitation environment of primary care to seek specialty or hospital care, they must
obtain an authorization from the primary care physician. The authorization operates
as the ticket to the specialist’s office; it also serves to alert the HMO of a pending
claim liability. After the specialist treats the patient, a claim is sent to the HMO for
payment.
For a claim to be paid properly the supporting data on the system must be current
and valid.128 The planets, as it were, must be in alignment. For example:
• The member must be currently enrolled at the time of service.
• The service must be covered by the member’s benefit plan.
• The service must be age and sex appropriate (e.g., no gynecological
services for men, no obstetrical services for women over or under
certain ages).
• The nature and extent of the services performed must not exceed
those that are authorized (e.g., a five day stay at a hospital when only
three days have been authorized.)
• The provider number must be correct and the provider must be
appropriate for the type of services billed (e.g., psychiatrists do not
bill for orthopedic surgery.)
• The service performed must be appropriate for the setting in which it
was performed (e.g., no open heart surgery at an office location.)
• There must be an authorization in the system which is current (many
plans limit the life of an authorization to a period of days or months.)
• The reimbursement must be the correct amount for that provider at
that location, either the agreed fee schedule rate or “usual and
customary” as established by the plan.
Although not exhaustive, this list suffices to convey the general extent of
information required for the task of claims payment.
5. Point of Service Plans
An HMO may also offer additional products or options to customers which
increase the data intensity of the process just described. Point of service (POS) plans
are one popular option in the managed care marketplace. Under a POS plan a
member may directly seek care outside of the HMO network, providing they pay
extra for the privilege. POS plans relieve some of the restrictions of the HMO by
permitting members to see the specialist of their choice. In addition to paying a
higher premium for this hybrid product, the member typically pays coinsurance of
20-30% of the usual and customary charge.129 Some HMOs may vary the
limitations, such as still requiring the primary care physician to authorize the visit.
128
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The POS model offers the best of both worlds to accounts and members alike.
Employers like the aspect of consumer choice, which keeps employees happy, yet
the account benefits from the ongoing cost containment of HMOs because the
employee pays the difference out of pocket. Members appreciate the safety valve
aspect of POS plans, knowing that they have the option of seeing a desired provider
who is not in the network, or an in-network provider for whom the primary care
physician may be unwilling to issue an authorization.
The advantages of POS plans for consumers are not without drawbacks.
Members may find their out-of-pocket expenses higher than expected when the
HMO applies its own “usual and customary” limit to the provider’s bill. This can
result in the member having to pay 100% of the excess charge in addition to the
expected coinsurance.130 In spite of this potential problem POS plans are the fastest
growing sector in health insurance.131
For the HMO, the information system demands of this appealing product are
considerable. The discussion above regarding the importance of coordinated and
timely data takes on even greater weight with POS products. This is particularly true
when a member opts to see a contracted specialist, but does so without an
authorization. The information system will have to determine if the service is
payable under the POS model (which means the member has to pay out of pocket,
and the specialist’s reimbursement might be higher than the in-plan contracted rate)
or if the service was an authorized visit for which the authorization has not yet hit the
system (in which case the member pays no coinsurance and the provider is paid the
appropriate contractual rate.)
Depending on the timing of the receipt of information, and the speed and
accuracy of data entry, particularly for authorizations, providers may easily be paid
at the wrong rates, members may be charged incorrectly for coinsurance, and both
may experience delays in payment due to the absence of preliminary data on the
system. These circumstances can effect not only the accuracy of payment, but also
the quality of customer service to both members and providers, as well as regulatory
requirements for prompt payment of valid claims. These operating and business
risks of POS plans clearly raise the bar in demanding highly effective information
systems for the HMO.
6. IBNR or “The Black Art”
IBNR stands for incurred but not reported. This acronym refers to “[t]he amount
of money that the plan had better accrue for medical expenses that it knows nothing
about yet. These are medical expenses that the authorization system has not captured
and for which claims have not yet hit the door. Unexpected IBNRs have torpedoed
more managed care plans than any other cause.”132
HMOs operate on a future orientation. Premium rates are based on the expected
utilization for a given population. At any one time, a substantial amount of the care
for which a plan is liable lies in the future because the total membership is receiving
care on an ongoing basis. “If the costs are simply booked as they come in, disaster is
130
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certain.”133 IBNR is a primary vehicle for forecasting expenses and trends in care
costs as well as trends in the type and setting of care which is being provided under
the plan. It is also the basis on which plans calculate statutory reserve and cash flow
requirements.
A particularly troublesome aspect of faulty accrual for IBNRs is the tailing effect.
A plan which underaccrues for IBNR in one period cannot easily solve the problem
in the next period because the expenses were already accrued and “keep rolling
in.”134 Each month’s accruals have to be adjusted, and the expenses for prior periods
suffer as well as for the current one.135 “Monthly performance gets muddied up with
adjustments for prior performance, and managers find themselves chasing their
tails.”136 Other systemic problems which contribute to faulty INBRs include rapid
growth in membership, inadequate premium due to low-balling rates or poor
collections, or flawed rating methodologies.137
Aptly characterized by the Wall Street Journal as “the black art”138 of HMOs,
accurate IBNR projections depend on the timeliness and quality of data already in
the system. Any problems with the validity of membership, claims or authorizations
data, the reporting system for these data, or the plan’s lag studies (which inform
management of aging of claims and amounts paid out for past and current periods
compared to accruals for these periods 139) can severely affect the accuracy of the
IBNR projections.
7. Medical Management
The same factors which influence the validity of the IBNR calculations are those
on which HMOs rely to manage care. Unlike a retail store which can observe the
flow of its physical inventory, HMOs depend entirely upon data to carry out
managed care’s eponymous function.
“Medical management reports are…
absolutely necessary tools for managers of health plans.”140 “Accurate membership
counts are necessary to compute ‘cost per employee’ statistics, which are the basis of
comparing utilization patterns from one period to the next.”141 Prompt and accurate
claims and authorization systems are an obvious necessity for effective management
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of the services for which a plan is liable. Only through data does the plan identify
systemic utilization problems, such as plan-wide overuse of emergency room
services. Trends of this type require different remedies than those that can be traced
to a particular provider or medical group or population.142
From this brief survey of the operational side of HMOs, it is apparent that a
sound, well designed and properly implemented information system is perhaps the
single most important determinant of an HMO’s long term success. Accurate and
timely information is essential for the successful delivery of the HMO’s health care
product. And, as with any business, the information system is the chief tool used by
management and board to identify the signs of incipient business and compliance
problems. The Board’s responsibility to oversee the effectiveness of the information
systems extends over all of these areas.
This article now turns to Oxford Health Plans, Inc., as a case study in how an
HMO’s faulty information system can precipitate business losses and regulatory
violations and expose the directors to personal liability for their failure to monitor the
system’s development and implementation.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OXFORD HEALTH PLAN
Oxford Health Plans, Inc. (Oxford), a Delaware corporation, provides health
benefit plans through various subsidiaries in New York, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Florida and Illinois. Oxford was founded by
Stephen Wiggins in 1984 as an innovative, customer focused and non-bureaucratic
organization which would win the hearts of its consumer customers.
Oxford experienced steady membership growth into the mid 1990s when the pace
became explosive. By the end of 1997 total membership exceeded two million
members.143 Together with membership growth came a steady rise in earnings and
stock price. The one-time darling of Wall Street made its initial public offering in
1991 at $2.25; at it peak in July, 1997 Oxford’s stock traded at $89.144 That was
before October 27, 1997 when the stock fell sixty-two percent and the company
shifted into a spiral of losses from which it has yet to recover fully.
A. Business Strategy and Culture
Like every other HMO, Oxford had a challenge in information systems, but
certain characteristics of Oxford’s business strategy and corporate culture put even
greater demands on the systems.
Capitalizing early on the promise of point-of-service plans, Oxford introduced
the “Freedom Plan” in 1988. This plan would account for 59.2% of total premiums,
serving 1.3 million members by 1997.145 As discussed above, POS plans make
prodigious demands on the information systems for timeliness and accuracy; given
the substantial membership enrolled in this program, the pressure on the system to
perform was even greater.
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Oxford was also an innovator in the types of service it would cover, being among
the first HMOs to offer access to nontraditional types of care, such as acupuncture
and herbal medicine within its network.146 While undoubtedly a crowd pleaser, one
result of this business strategy would have been an increased system demand to
support an expansion of the provider network. Because access to non-traditional
providers had not previously been offered, these practitioners would most likely not
have been on the provider file, and so their addition represents a net increase in file
volume. The files might also require some modification as the credentialing
requirements for non-traditional providers could differ from traditional providers.
In 1997, in response to customer demand for better cost management, Oxford
introduced an entirely new patient care and reimbursement strategy for members
with chronic illnesses or other major health problems.147 This program permitted
qualified patients to select their own specialists without a referral.
The
reimbursement innovation was to pay the specialists a flat rate for the entire episode
of care, from diagnostic tests, through surgery to post-operative rehabilitation.
Although flat cases rates have been used by many HMOs, the scope of services
subject to the rate was much greater than the industry norm.
The success of this innovative reimbursement and care program was highly
dependent upon an effective information system. This program called for putting “a
wealth of information at the
members’ fingertips, including [physicians’]
backgrounds, rates, and results from previous cases and patient satisfaction
surveys.”148 On the payment side, providers were to be paid in stages as the
treatment progressed, based on reporting back to the health plan.149 To support this
program on an information system, some of the steps involved would be: to
distinguish which patients were allowed under this payment scheme from those who
were regular Oxford members; to distinguish for these specially participating
providers a separate fee schedule and to establish a unique payment mechanism
which recognizes an incremental and variable progression of treatment.
The information processing complexity of this unique payment scheme becomes
apparent when compared to the conventional case rate contract. Obstetricians, for
example, are often paid a flat rate for prenatal care, delivery and one post-partum
visit; the rate will vary depending on whether the delivery was normal or via
Cesarean.150 A single payment is made following the delivery.
In contrast, the Oxford payment arrangement calls for incremental payments
based on stages of progress in a treatment protocol, which may or may not be
represented by a single procedure code, and may quite possibly comprise a number
of procedures. This means the protocol itself must be coded into the system so as to
permit incremental progress to be recorded; a pricing break-down of the incremental
146
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steps is required; given the complexity of the patient’s condition such as would put
them into this program in the first place it is reasonable to assume that not all
patients will have the same exact progress. Such a scheme is not impossible to
analyze and code; it is, however, complex and time consuming.
Oxford was not modest in its expectations of the scale of this program, projecting
savings of twenty to thirty percent over current specialty care costs.151 Given
Oxford’s total specialty care costs account for about $1.7 billion out of a total $2.2
billion of medical expenses,152 this program was projected to save between $300
million and $500 million.
The corporate culture of Oxford also contributed to extraordinary pressures on
the information systems. Priding itself as iconoclastic and anti-bureaucratic, Oxford
eschewed standard procedures. Provider contracts were creatively negotiated,
sometimes with changes made at the last minute to mollify practitioners.153 Such a
strategy can improve relationships with providers by showing flexibility and
responsiveness. But the fruits of creativity can often be hard to code into a logical
system.154 In 1997, Oxford had a provider network of over 60,000 providers, most of
whom contracted individually and directly with the health plan.155 Even if only a
fraction of the providers negotiated unique contracts, the toll in human and system
resources to code and maintain these special provisions could mount quickly.
B. Membership Growth
Added to the volatile mix of business strategy and corporate culture was
explosive growth in membership. Of the two million members in the plan by the end
of 1997 roughly half had joined in the last two years.156 In the New York plan alone,
the growth rate was 300% for this period.157 A critical source of this growth came in
the aggressive pursuit of Medicare and Medicaid business, bringing in members who
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are usually sicker and certainly older than the rest of the plan’s membership.158
Medicare membership grew to 161,000 by year end 1997, or eight percent of total
membership, yet this program accounted for twenty-two percent of total
premiums.159 Medicaid membership for the same period reached 189,600,
accounting for 7.7% of total premiums.160
C. In-house Development of Oxford’s Information System
In 1993, Oxford decided to develop its own new information system, rejecting
the option to buy an existing system. In early 1996, the old system was staggering
under the pressures of membership growth and claims backlogs were growing.161
During 1996, company officials turned up the heat to complete the new system,
“racing against the clock”, according to one insider.162 In September 1996, the
company converted from the old to the new system largely in “one fell swoop.”163
Almost immediately the system failed at essential tasks. The process of entering
membership stretched up to fifteen minutes in some cases.164 Efforts to link the old
and new systems, to facilitate pulling up old information, ended up corrupting data
on both sides.165 Claims payment appears to have ground to a near halt.166 By late
1996, unpaid provider claims had risen to $625 million.167
While no system implementation is immune from problems, it appears that haste
and lack of testing are two obvious culprits in the disaster at Oxford.168 Hubris, too,
played a part. One company insider told the Wall Street Journal, “[T]hey thought
they could do almost anything better than anybody else … [b]ut they were novices at
developing software.”169
While developing an in-house system in any business is neither impossible nor
necessarily a recipe for disaster, there are known pitfalls. One industry expert
suggests that self-developed software is often a poor business choice as, compared to
expectations, it typically yields only half the desired functionality, but costs twice as
much and takes twice as long to develop and implement.170 This rule of thumb even
applies to organizations which have experience in systems development.
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A 1979 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) on software development
projects for government agencies found a number of common problems when
organizations chose to develop software instead of purchasing existing products.171
While this study examined contracts with consultants for software development,
many of the problems identified by the GAO apply equally in the case of a business
developing its own systems. These included: failure of top management to commit
appropriate management resources and trained staff to the project, failure of staff to
prepare complete business requirements prior to system design, unanticipated
changes to the scope of work and inadequate testing.172 This study also found that
the total cost and development times for the software development work were twice
the original estimates.173
Migrating from one information system to another is no easy task. During the
migration period both the old and new systems must be supported, as part of the
process to verify the integrity of the new system.174 “This [migration] process is
complex and requires numerous resources, both user and IS [information systems]
operations involvement, and a strong organizational commitment to be successful.
Conversion strategies and work plans should be developed in advance for all of the
following: infrastructure migration, application migration, process improvement
(developing new procedures to capitalize on the efficiencies of the new application),
training schedules and job definitions.”175 This characterization of the steps
necessary to assure a smooth conversion is at odds with insiders’ description of the
process at Oxford as well as that of the New York Insurance Department
(Department) which noted poor planning, inexperienced management, and
inadequate systems testing as important factors in the system’s failure.176
The system flaws at Oxford were stunningly apparent and largely unexpected.177
Inability to process claims properly resulted in backlogs that stretched into the
hundreds of millions of dollars. Oxford resorted to paying providers lump-sum
settlements, explained as “loans” to be reconciled against actual claims when the
company caught up with the claims backlog.178 Without recent detailed claims
history, it became difficult to project the IBNR expense or reserve requirements.
On the membership side, difficulties maintaining accurate membership data
resulted in billing problems. Bills to accounts were often late or wrong; eventually it
Association, the largest association representing information technology lawyers around the
world Jan. 7, 1999.
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appears the plan just stopped billing some accounts entirely.179 As a result Oxford
didn’t know how many members it had, who they were and whether or not their
premiums were paid. Eventually the plan would write off care costs for some 30,000
members who had either disenrolled at the time they received care, or refused to pay
because they had not been properly billed.180
On the cost management front the inability to process claims and membership
meant that no meaningful cost tracking could be maintained. During 1997, for
example, while Medicare revenue rose 4.3%, unbeknownst to the company, the
expenses for this population rose twenty-one percent.181
From the time of the system implementation in September, 1996, Oxford
management had strenuously denied the extent of the problems. Stephen Wiggins
repeated expressed confidence to members, providers and regulators that the systems
problems were just about fixed. In response to a fiery complaint from the New York
State Society of Oncologists and Hematologists, complaining of excuses for
computer problems and delayed claims payments, Wiggins wrote back accusing the
Society of “resort[ing] to extremism and slander in an attempt to serve your clients’
interests.”182 The company accepted that it had a big problem when the New York
State Insurance Superintendent, Neil Levin, demanded to meet with the board of
directors to discuss the Department’s concerns about the company’s operations.
D. Announcement of Losses Leads to Drop in Stock Price
On October 27, 1997, the day before Levin was to meet with the board, Oxford
announced its first quarterly loss in its thirteen year history. The stock price
plummeted sixty-two percent that day, resulting in a three billion dollar paper loss.183
At the time of the announcement, Wiggins confidently estimated the company would
return to profitability soon. He would never again have cause for such optimism.
Later, “[u]nder pressure from the New York State Department of Insurance, Oxford
acknowledged it had misjudged the cost of care and would take a charge against
fourth quarter earnings and show a loss for the year.”184
E. Investigation by the New York Insurance Department
On May 9, 1997, spurred by complaints from consumers and providers about
claims payment delays by HMOs and other insurance entities, New York Governor
George Pataki ordered the state Insurance Department to launch a major
investigation into the health insurers’ claims payment practices.185 Oxford was the
first HMO targeted for this examination.
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Following a months-long and contentious examination, the Insurance Department
issued its Market Conduct Report on Oxford in late December, 1997. Specific to
Oxford’s operations and systems the report concluded that Oxford continued to
experience significant delays in claims payment, still could not quantify the claims
backlog, and lacked procedures to ensure compliance with New York state law and
regulations.186 While the report attributed much of the operational problems to the
newly implemented information system, it found that “underlying [these concerns] is
the problem that many of the issues described herein appear to be caused simply by
poor planning and/or inexperienced management.”187
As a result of the investigation, the Department fined Oxford three million dollars
for violations of state laws and regulations.188 In addition, the Department ordered
Oxford to pay $500,000 in restitution to customers and health care providers related
to unapproved contracts and rates.189 Oxford agreed to a number of corrective
actions. Among those related to the systems problems included commitments to:
1. Evaluate, augment and where necessary, replace senior management in
consultation with the Board of Oxford Health Plans, Inc.
2. Strengthen the Board by the addition of at least two outside directors.
3. Retain an outside management consultant to evaluate the information
systems, internal controls and management reporting.
4. Strengthen and augment internal controls and procedures capable of
generating reliable data concerning claims, premiums and expenses.190
When the dust finally cleared, Oxford reported losses of $291 million for 1997,191
and paid an additional $200 million into reserves.192 By the end of 1998, the
company had lost a reported $952 million over the previous five quarters.193 The
stock has fallen from a peak of $89 a share in July, 1997194 to a low of $7.375 a year
later.195 The stock has recovered somewhat, trading at $13.75 on December 23,
1998.196
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Unexpected payments to reserves resulted in a reduction of the company’s equity
to roughly $400 million by year end 1997.197 Oxford sought financing to meet its
reserve requirements, borrowing $100 million in short term funding from Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette in February and March, 1998.198 The company also secured $700
million in debt and additional equity financing, increasing internal borrowing costs
and diluting the value of outstanding shares.199 Investment analysts have been wary
of continued losses which could result in increased reserve requirements and further
dilution of outstanding shares.200
Stephen Wiggins resigned as chairman in February, 1998.201 He remains on the
Oxford board today, having served on a three member executive committee charged
with helping turn around the company. In January, 1998 the company named
Norman D. Payson, a physician and former CEO of Healthsource, Inc., as Oxford’s
new CEO-elect. Dr. Payson “plunked down $10 million of his hard-earned money
for Oxford’s stock.”202 Not many others are following suit. Anxiety over the
company’s anticipated future losses and concern over the company’s lack of
communication with the investment community have made potential investors
leery.203
As for the information system at the root of many of Oxford’s problems, which
cost upwards of $100 million to develop, the company decided in March, 1998 to
scrap it.204 At that time, Oxford was considering alternative systems approaches,
including outsourcing functions to a third party or replacing the failed systems
completely with one or more systems available on the market from third party
vendors.205 The company estimated that it would take another twelve to eighteen
months to identify and implement the alternative system solution.206
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V. LESSONS FROM OXFORD - HOW DO DIRECTORS MEET THEIR DUTY OF CARE?
Oxford’s management and directors will soon be subject to great scrutiny in the
courts. In the aftermath of the stock price drop in late October, 1997, Oxford faces a
battery of lawsuits and government inquiries. As of April, 1998, over forty-five suits
were filed against the company and its officers and directors alleging violations of
disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207 In addition, at
least ten shareholder derivative actions have been filed.208 Oxford expects more
litigation to follow.209 The Attorney General of New York, the Securities Exchange
Commission, and the Health Care Financing Administration have all initiated their
own investigations of the company.210
It will be some time before the details of the decisions and actions of Oxford’s
directors will be fully known. For this reason, much of the discussion which follows
is speculative. Yet, Oxford’s experience illustrates, by omission rather than
commission, the steps that the board of a large HMO or health insurer might be
expected to take when considering the strategic decision of changing the
organization’s information system, a decision with major implications for the success
of the business and for effective corporate compliance with state and federal laws.
There are three timeframes of interest, each with a key question. First, at the
point of the original decision in 1993 to develop a system internally, did the board
fully understand the risks and benefits of this strategy? Second, once the decision
was taken to build the system as opposed to buy one, what steps did the board take to
monitor this project in keeping with the board’s duty of oversight? Third, once the
system conversion occurred, were there sufficient warning signs to trigger the
board’s duty of inquiry before October, 1997?
A. Decision to Build an In-house Information System
In general, courts are loathe to second guess a business decision by directors,
provided that the process of reaching the decision is considered deliberately and in
good faith, or was otherwise rational.211 In the case of Oxford, the existing
information system was clearly inadequate for the anticipated growth in membership
and complexity of current and future products.212 As such, a decision to change or
enhance the system would have a rational basis as it would be viewed as essential for
the future success of the business.
Given Oxford’s innovative approach to product design and focus on customer
service, the decision to reject existing systems from third party vendors may have
been rational if the systems available on the market did not offer the unique
functionality the company required. Companies routinely make “buy or build”
decisions based on the specific needs of the business, the skills of management and
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other personnel, and the relative costs and benefits of products available in the
marketplace.
The key question in this circumstance is whether the board fully understood the
business risks involved in developing the system in-house. Did management present
information to the board which identified the potential risks, such as the likelihood
that self-developed software ultimately yields lower functionality at greater cost and
time to implement than anticipated? Was the board informed of the required skill
level of personnel to lead and carry out such a project? Did the company employ or
plan to recruit staff with these skills? Did management seek external expertise, such
as management or systems consultants, to advise on the merits and risks of this
decision? Was the board provided with the information from the consultants? A
court would consider all of these factors when determining whether the board
followed a reasonable process in reaching the decision.
Another element in a decision to develop a system in-house is the foregone
protections of the vendor contract. Whether a business purchases a complete
information system from, or develops one collaboratively with, a vendor the
purchaser has the benefit of certain protections. First, presumably the vendor has
expertise.213 Additionally, the contract terms will typically include beneficial
provisions for the purchaser, such as incremental delivery dates, financial penalties
for missed deadlines, warranties such as assurances of Year 2000 compliance,
binding arbitration provisions, and requirements that the vendor have adequate
insurance coverage for errors and omission.214
Because of the contractual relationship with the vendor, the purchaser also has a
number of legal bases on which to rely. These may include actions for breach of
warranty for fitness for a particular use, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of express warranties as to the ability of the system to meet
the client’s objectives, common law fraud, violation of state deceptive practices
statutes, and violation of the Lanham Act.215 The law of contracts will permit a
plaintiff to recover direct and consequential damages or alternatively to sue for
specific performance.216 Fraud actions may result in awards for punitive damages.217
Obviously the threat of legal action on a contract is no guarantee of perfection,
but the risk of legal action does serve, at a minimum, to incline the vendor towards
agreed upon performance. In addition, the vendor company has its own reputation in
the marketplace to consider, positively in terms of satisfied customers, and the
predictable opposite.
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Finally, because of the high rate of change in information technology, as well as
in the health care industry, in-house development exposes the company to the risk of
the system being out-of-date in a short time.218 While vendors also assume this risk,
a technology vendor can be expected to stay up-to-date in system and industry trends
in order to compete effectively for new business; presumably the cost to the vendor
in staff time and research is recovered through its pricing methodology. A purchaser
in another business is less likely to make the investment in staff, education and
research necessary to stay at the forefront of the information technology industry.
Once a company has decided to build an in-house system, its directors might
reasonably be expected to inquire of management how the company would
compensate for the lack of contractual protections. For example, will the company
acquire systems expertise through hiring new staff? Will project leaders and staff
receive incentive compensation based on value to the company of the fully
implemented system? Can the project itself be insured? What specific actions can
management take to mitigate the tendency of self-development projects to fail to
meet expectations? By posing such questions directors can demonstrate their
understanding of the risks inherent in the decision to build an in-house system.
B. Monitoring the Information Systems Development Project
Once the decision is made to build a system in-house, a board faces another set of
questions related to appropriate monitoring of the development process. Who will be
accountable for the project? What are the quality assurance procedures, plans and
milestones for key phases in the design, development and implementation process?
What are the fail-safe or fall back provisions in the event that development is
delayed and business operations are threatened? What reports will the board receive
throughout this process so that directors can judge for themselves that the project is
proceeding according to plan? How can the reports be validated to ensure that they
are accurate? How will the board assure itself that the ongoing business and
compliance requirements of the company are being met during the system
development and implementation phases?
When a system is developed entirely in-house, the corporation has neither the
actual remedies nor the threat of meaningful legal action to encourage performance
by staff. While a company may dismiss an employee for negligence, to recover
damages the company must prove that the employee was accountable for the harm
done. At Oxford, such accountability appeared to be wholly lacking. When the
extent of the disaster became known in October, 1997, a number of the company’s
financial analysts offered their resignations. Wiggins refused to accept them,
reportedly saying “[w]e were all blindsided here. This wasn’t something you could
point to a single person to hold responsible for.”219
That the chairman of the board believed there was no single person accountable
for the success of a project of the scale, complexity and critical nature of this system
in itself suggests that the board failed in at least this aspect of oversight. In any
event, when the person perhaps most identified with the company’s failure, Wiggins
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himself, resigned as chairman in February 1998, Oxford’s board voted to pay him a
$9 million severance package.
It can be inferred from the complete absence of public acrimony and accusations
in the aftermath of such an enormous business setback that there were no major
systems consultants retained by Oxford on this project. Neither the Market Conduct
Report nor Oxford’s 1997 Annual Report make any mention of management or
systems consultants retained to assist in the development of the system.220 In
contrast, the company’s independent accountants, KPMG, have received
considerable adverse press for its failure to identify the problems with the system and
Oxford’s financial position. In both 1996 and 1997, KPMG approved Oxford’s
books without qualification and made “no mention of the company’s billing and
payment woes.”221 KPMG has been added as a defendant in a number of the lawsuits
pending against Oxford.222 No other consultants have been named as defendants.
The use of consultants at the least to assist in planning and oversight of the
project might well have brought a degree of rigor, accountability and proven
procedures to a project of this scale on which the board could have reasonably relied
for assurance of sound systems development. Given the apparent lack of software
development experience among the Oxford staff, retention of experienced
management consultants might fairly be viewed as a minimum requirement.
The time pressures imposed on the system development process due to the
growth in membership in 1996 could also have reasonably suggested to the board
that professional consulting help was vital. It is a common observation in the
systems world that while one person can make a baby in nine months, it doesn’t
follow that nine people can make a baby in one month. Some things simply do take
time to do well, especially adequate testing  which appears to have been lacking at
Oxford. With more experienced help, it is at least plausible that the board would
have been better informed of the requirements of a sound development process, the
system’s status and the company’s performance as measured against those standards
and the risks involved in speeding up too fast. Further, independent consultants
might also have been more willing than insiders to alert senior management and the
board to problems in the development process.
As discussed above, an HMO’s information system is the source of information
upon which much regulatory compliance depends. As a publicly traded company,
Oxford was subject to Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and NASDAQ
requirements which call for timely disclosure of material facts regarding the
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company’s financial condition.223 Oxford was also subject to many federal and state
insurance regulations governing operations, reporting and reserves. This additional
burden on the information systems exposes the company to the risk of fines,
suspension of trading or delisting by securities markets, exclusion from federal
entitlement programs and being shut down by state insurance regulators. These
factors add significantly to the risk assumed when a company embarks alone to
develop and implement major systems.
Given every director’s duty to understand the fundamentals of the business,224 it
may be reasonable to expect the board to have recognized the types of problems the
HMO might encounter during and following the time of the system implementation.
The board had to have known the plan was growing at a feverish pace, that the high
demand groups of Medicaid and Medicare were targeted areas of growth, and that
the plan was embarking on strategic product initiatives  all of which would put
added demands on the information system.
A widely used industry text, The Managed Health Care Handbook,225 devotes a
chapter to common operational problems in managed health care plans. 226 Oxford,
at the time of the system development and implementation, was clearly experiencing
two of these problems: uncontrolled growth and systems inability to manage the
business.227 It is a reasonable argument that these factors alone should have been
sufficient to alert the board to a need for close attention to the systems project on
which so much depended. This attention is even more important, since the failure of
any HMO’s systems is a root cause of many other common problems: inaccurate
IBNR calculations, failure to reconcile accounts receivable and membership, and
failure to track medical costs and utilization correctly.228 This trifecta of problems
formed the core of the plan’s ultimate disaster.
In light of such risks, reasonable directors could be expected to ensure that the
systems project was managed carefully by fully accountable and competent staff,
that the board was kept apprised of the significant design and development
milestones, that the project plan specifically addressed the key areas of business and
compliance risk, and that the board would receive regular, meaningful and
documented performance reports. In the absence of retained consultants, the board

223
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would be expected to take additional steps to ensure that the staff with accountability
for this project had the expertise to manage all the phases of the process.
C. Attention to Warning Signs of Trouble.
Once a new system is implemented, the effective functioning of the system and
the information which it brings to light regarding the operation of the business must
be continually monitored. For management and staff this monitoring is at a detailed
level. For the board, this role is carried out at a much greater remove. Given this
distance from the operational level, the board must rely on information from
management. The key questions for the board in this situation include: What are the
proper types of information which the board should review? What are the sources of
this information? How does the board assure itself of the reliability of the
information and the one who provides it? What are the indicators which the board
should recognize as warning signs of potential problems?
Financial statements from internal sources and independent accountants are a
chief source of information for directors. As noted above, Oxford’s independent
accountants found no problems with the company’s systems prior to the Insurance
Department investigation.229 In the absence of information to the contrary which
would call into question the reliability of the accountant’s reports, management and
directors could have reasonably relied on this information. This being so, to the
extent that the financial statements themselves showed red flags, Oxford’s board was
clearly on notice of problems with business operations. Three warnings were
apparent from financial records as early as spring of 1997.
The trend of the financial bottom line for the eighteen months prior to October,
1997 was “picture perfect” with steadily rising profits and a constant medical loss
ratio.230 But as is so often true, the devil is in the details. Oxford’s quarterly
statements showed unsettling changes in the company’s financial position. Unpaid
medical bills reached $625 million by late 1996 and remained “stubbornly high.”231
Operating cash flow was negative starting in early 1997; it was to reach a nadir of
negative $107.3 million.232 By the spring, premiums owed but uncollected - because
accounts weren’t being billed  amounted to some forty percent of revenue; this
amount had doubled in the six months since the new system was installed in
September 1996.233 All of these problems stemmed directly from a system which
couldn’t carry out basic functions: generating accurate bills, processing premiums,
enrolling members and paying claims.
Should these kinds of anomalies have prompted the Oxford board, or any board,
to inquire further? Were there other routine sources of information relating to the
new system and operating performance available, such as might be generated by
internal auditors? Was a board committee, such as the Audit Committee, delegated
responsibility to oversee the system development more closely than the full board?
If so, did this committee set its own agenda and request reporting from the internal
229
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auditors or from management so as to assure its members that the performance of the
system met the board’s expectations?
The Oxford board presumably had other sources of information which could
reasonably have prompted further inquiry into the conditions and performance of the
information systems. When the volume of complaints from providers over delayed
claims prompted New York’s governor to order an investigation of the largest
HMOs, it might have been reasonable for Oxford’s board to initiate an inquiry of its
own into the causes of and planned remedies for the claims backlogs. When the
company began to issue lump-sum payments to providers as loans against future
claims payment, an informed director, familiar with the fundamentals of the
business, might have raised the question of the impact of the payments on the IBNR
and required reporting. Finally, after months of poor system performance, with no
noticeable improvements, a reasonable director might at least inquire as to the value
of an independent consultant’s assessment of the systems as a way to validate
management’s continued assertions that the system is almost fixed. Indeed this was
one of the recommendations of Department to which Oxford belatedly agreed.
D. Application of the Gross Negligence Standard
As discussed previously, the vast majority of courts will apply the gross
negligence standard when determining whether a corporation’s board of directors
met their duty of care. As to a decision to build an in-house house information
system, a court’s due care analysis will be guided by the business judgment rule.
This rule gives rise to the presumption that, in the absence of fraud, self dealing or
bad faith, directors are presumed to have reached a decision in good faith.234
Specifically, a court will “look for evidence as to whether the board has acted in a
deliberate and knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring alternatives.”235 The
protective presumption can be rebutted where it can be shown that directors were not
informed when making their decision in which case the directors may be found
personally liable.
Courts will view certain factors as particularly relevant in assessing whether
directors were adequately informed. These factors include extreme haste in the
decisionmaking process where the circumstances of the decision do not indicate the
need for speedy action; lack of board preparation as shown by the absence of, or
inadequate time for the board to review in advance, meaningful and documented
information supporting the reasons for and alternatives to the decision; and lack of
questioning and involvement by the board to the extent that the board’s action
appears to be mere acquiescence to management recommendations.236
When reviewing the board’s attentiveness to and oversight of the information
system development and implementation once the decision is made, courts will look
to see whether directors have “exercise[d] a good faith effort to be informed and …
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[have applied] appropriate judgment.237 Where directors are found to meet this
standard, they will be “deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.” 238
As a practical matter, conduct which fails to meet the measure of good faith must
be egregious. “Only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight  such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information
and reporting system exists  will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability.”239 This standard is clearly “director-protective” in its
qualifying language.240 Yet it also reflects the realistic limits on the ability of any
board to assume operational responsibility for the ultimate success of the information
system.
To determine whether the Oxford board met its duty of care in the decision to
build its information system and the manner in which the board oversaw the
development and implementation of the system, a court would be expected to
scrutinize the process utilized by the board, the types and quality of information
available and used by management and board, as well as the degree of informed and
independent judgment used by the individual directors. Such an inquiry is wholly
fact dependent and enormously detailed. Until the litigation against the Oxford
directors has progressed and this level of information is publicly available, any
suggestion as to whether or not the directors failed in their duty of care is purely
speculative. However, the available information raises serious questions about the
manner in which the board made this critical business decision.
E. Causation Analysis
In the event that a board of directors would be found to have breached its duty of
care in the context of the decision to build and oversight of information systems,
there remains the hurdle of proving the board’s conduct was the proximate cause of
the losses to the corporation.
In the case of Oxford, causation could be particularly difficult prove because the
company was not alone among HMOs in experiencing surprise losses in 1997.
Managed care stocks as a whole dropped almost twelve percent that year.241 One
rating service found that fifty-seven percent of the nation’s HMOs ended the year in
the red.242 Industry leaders attributed the fall-off to rising medical costs and meager
profit margins.243
Kaiser Permanente suffered its first-ever losses in 1997, for at least two of the
same reasons as Oxford: difficulty forecasting rising health care costs and faster
membership growth than the plan could handle.244 As late as November, 1997 Kaiser
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was projecting a loss of fifty million dollars;245 the actual loss for the year proved to
be $270 million. Aetna/U.S Healthcare, faced with care costs rising at fourteen
percent, took a $160 million charge in the third quarter of 1997 for unanticipated
medical expenses.246
Like Oxford, a number of HMOs have found the Medicare HMO business a
money loser. Aetna/U.S. Healthcare in September, 1998 announced it was leaving
the Medicare HMO markets in six states and the District of Columbia because the
government reimbursement rates rendered the program unprofitable.247 Prudential
HealthCare has done the same.248
Against this backdrop of wide-spread industry losses and general failure to
recognize the rising trend in medical costs, a court may have trouble tying Oxford’s
losses and drop in stock price to either Oxford’s decision to build its own system or
the board’s lack of oversight. It might be argued that, had the system been
functioning properly and providing prompt notice of cost trends, Oxford may have
had the chance to change the cost trend through, e.g., targeted patient and provider
education and increased attention to utilization review. Yet, the company’s and the
market’s circumstances in 1997 make it unlikely that Oxford could have effected a
significant cost turnaround on short notice.
The year long lock-in of premiums and time-consuming regulatory requirements
for approval of rates would have prevented the company from raising prices
promptly, the most effective means of countering higher costs. Much of the growth
in costs was attributable to the new Medicare and Medicaid populations who were
generally less familiar, and likely less compliant, with HMO rules. Although
member education can be effective in reducing costs, it takes time for this effect to
show up on the bottom line. In addition, efficient access to Medicare members may
be a problem. An HMO can often utilize an employer’s benefits or human resources
staff to communicate with group members. Medicare members, in contrast, are
individual enrollees, with no comparable intermediary through which the HMO can
communicate efficiently. Finally, the success of provider education will be at least
somewhat dependent on the quality of the relationship between the HMO and the
provider community. Oxford had experienced claims payment problems under the
old system; in addition, the company’s financial results had for many years been
stellar. Providers may not have been responsive to the company’s efforts to
minimize its losses by changing provider behavior or reimbursement.
Another factor in the causation analysis will be to separate out the specific effects
of the information system from the general effects of the company’s operating losses.
The first big drop in Oxford’s stock price occurred on the news that the plan was
reporting its first ever quarterly loss. On October 27, 1997, the full extent of
Oxford’s systems disaster was not generally known. This information became public
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only later in 1997 and early 1998. While the systems were clearly implicated in the
loss position of the company, it is arguable that even if the systems had been perfect,
Oxford’s first loss in eight years would still have sent the stock into a tailspin.
Even if the Oxford board was found to have breached its duty of care in failing to
heed the various financial warning signals in late 1996 and early 1997, this conduct
would probably not stand up to the cause-in-fact analysis. By the time the red flags
should have been obvious to the board, in late 1996 and early 1997, the system was
already in place and the damage largely done. It is highly unlikely that the system
could have been fixed fast enough to have avoided the operational and stock losses
given the lagging nature of HMO costs and the lingering quality of bad projections.
Oxford’s eventual decision to abandon its $100 million investment in the system and
seek alternative solutions suggests that even if the board had recognized the
problems in a timely manner and demanded an emergency effort to fix the system
the problems were simply too great to overcome in time to avoid the financial losses.
VI. CONCLUSION
It will be some time before Oxford’s pending shareholder suits wend their way
through the legal system and the details of the board’s decisions and actions become
known. As Delaware law will most likely govern the outcome, it is to be expected
that the conduct of Oxford’s directors will not be found to have risen to the level of
gross negligence. No evidence of self-dealing or fraud by directors has been raised
in the many media accounts or in the New York Insurance Department’s Market
Conduct Report. This leaves only the basis of lack of good faith on which to
establish personal liability. A court will have to find that the directors failed utterly
even to attempt to assure that the information system was effective; the Caremark
good faith standard is “quite high” indeed.249 Given that management and the
independent accountants appeared to have confidence in the company’s financial
statements up until October, 1997, the directors may find additional protection in
their reasonable reliance on these documents as these statements, at the time,
suggested that the system’s problems did not affect the bottom line.
None of the parties to the pending shareholder litigation will be pleased with this
outcome. Such a conclusion will obviously disappoint the Oxford shareholders who
bore enormous losses due, in large part, to the systems disaster. The operating losses
in 1997 and 1998 and the total waste of the investment in the failed system have
deeply eroded the value of the company. Although the cost of litigation will be
borne by the company’s D&O insurance, Oxford will pay in the end, in higher
insurance premiums.
The directors themselves will find little solace in vindication. They will pay a
great personal price even in winning. The legal process will examine every step in
their decisionmaking and oversight over the period from 1993 through 1997. While
a court may spare the directors the extreme label of gross negligence, the public and
the investment community will draw their own conclusions about the competence
and attentiveness of Oxford’s directors. The reputation of the individual directors
will be tainted for a long time to come.
The ultimate beneficiaries of Oxford’s downfall may well be the shareholders
and directors of other HMOs and health insurers for whom Oxford’s experience will
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serve as a cautionary tale. For those companies embarking on major information
systems initiatives in the future, the lessons from Oxford should result in far greater
rigor in decisionmaking than appears to have occurred in Oxford’s boardroom. It is
to be hoped that other directors will recognize the need for competence,
sophistication and pragmatism so that they can better meet their duty of attention in
oversight of information systems. This is as it should be, given the strategic
importance of information systems in HMOs and health insurance today.
The business and compliance pressures facing HMOs are enormous: the intensely
competitive environment, the rapid rate of change within the industry, the constant
tension between enhancing choice while reducing costs and the ever growing
complexity of state and federal government requirements. Not one of these
challenges can be met without effective information systems. It is a question of
survival, let alone success. The best interests of the HMO corporation require an
information system which can carry out its crucial business functions. This business
imperative, if not the legal imperative, requires more of a director than merely the
absence of bad faith to meet her duty of care in oversight of the HMO’s information
systems.
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the legal and strategic issues raised by the use of
information systems in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other
managed care organizations. Given the critical nature of information systems to an
HMO’s business success and regulatory compliance, the large financial investment
HOMs make in their systems, and the widely publicized concerns over the year 2000
“millenium bug” problem, information systems are appropriately a matter of concern
to an HMO’s board of directors.
The recent experience of Oxford Health Plans, Inc. offers a case study in the
apparent failure of the directors to monitor adequately the in-house development of
an information system. The systems disaster which this corporation suffered in 1997
led to a dramatic drop in stock price, from which the company has yet to recover, as
well as intense scrutiny by state and federal regulators and countless shareholder
derivative actions against the directors.
Corporate directors are subject to the fiduciary duty of care. Despite statutes in
some states requiring directors to act prudently, state courts almost always apply the
standard of gross negligence. As a result, even when directors act without due
deliberation in their decision, it is rare that a court will find them to have failed in
their duty of care. The business and regulatory community may find otherwise,
however, when directors fail to evaluate information systems options carefully and
the business suffers as a result.

